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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

Commell 14

DAMI-ZD

30 January 1979

Army review completed

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB GAMBINO, CHAIRMAN, SECURITY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: SECOM Management Planning Conference (March)

Bob:

You asked for some suggested topics:

- a. Topic: How to Reestablish National Consensus on Information Security. Scope: National (political, media, public, judicial, bureaucracy) attitudes and beliefs about extent and nature of national information security requirements to protect intelligence activities (and other "classified information") in disarray. Happened in last 7-8 years. Without rough consensus, Executive Branch cannot make system work. Bureaucrats complaining to each other will not solve. Limited, bureaucrat oriented legislation not much help. Problem substantially political at heart. Political interaction (Legislative-Executive-Media) in a public debate, while slow and "inefficient" may be only way to reestablish consensus. Substance of issues extensive: "OK" for press to probe, pick, and publish; "wrong" for bureaucrat to reveal: "OK" for Congress/Staff to reveal 99 percent of a "secret," withholding 1 percent classified, allowing hostile element to "estimate" accurate picture; "litigious" involvement of lawyers in process forces compromise; "investigative" process, etc. Should "National Commission" be recommended?
- b. <u>Topic</u>: NFIB SOP for Community Damage Assessments. <u>Scope</u>: Damage assessment process for intelligence information, methods and sources now informal, relatively unsophisticated. Constantinides initial work. Unauthorized Disclosures Working Group output necessarily limited. Highly sophisticated net assessment capability required for meaningful damage assessments. SECOM can "manage" but NFAC and other agency analysts needed.
- c. <u>Topic</u>: Future Operating Procedures for SECOM and DCI. <u>Scope</u>: Collegial, cooperative, with strong leadership; or "executive authority" operation, with DCI exercising centralized authority to act or issue binding orders with or without general agreement. Which most effective; or have EO 12036 and Administration proposals on S.2525 already pre-empted discussion; delineation of SECOM jurisdictions vis-a-vis those of other committees and "centers."
- d. <u>Topic</u>: Views on New Compartmentation Proposals. <u>Scope</u>: Does new proposal make progress? How? Without regard to agency positions, what do SECOM members really think about proposal? How could it be improved? If SECOM gets "policing" function, what will be needed, and how to handle?

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e. Topic: Main Threats to Security of Intelligence Information, Methods, and Sources in Next Years. Scope: Trends in threats to security of intelligence activities, at least those threats of foreign origin, have not changed much in recent years, but the security environment may be changing (SALT, PRC shifts, new ME alignments). Should SECOM request long-range CI trends projection from CI production community, estimating nature, scope and course of future threats to security of US intelligence activities, as a basis for SECOM advice to NFIB and DCI?

f. Topic: Training and Developing Intelligence Community Security Specialists. Scope: Comparing security training and development in Intelligence Community agencies; differences, distinctions between agencies with intelligence missions only, and multi-mission agencies; impact of differences on overall security of intelligence activities.

I am sure I will think of others, but these are for starters. The Peary session could be the best idea to come to SECOM for a long time.

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(Human Systems)